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I. Overview 
Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, has been the dominant institution in the country 
for most of its post-independence history. After decades of military rule, it began the 
shift to a semi-civilian government. A new generation of leaders in the military and 
in government pushed the transition far further and much faster than anyone could 
have imagined. Major questions remain, however, about the Tatmadaw’s intentions, 
its ongoing involvement in politics and the economy, and whether and within what 
timeframe it will accept to be brought under civilian control. Transforming from an 
all-powerful military to one that accepts democratic constraints on its power will be 
an enormous challenge. 
The Tatmadaw’s institutional perspective is heavily influenced by its role in Myan-
mar’s anti-colonial struggle – the leaders of which founded the military – and its early 
post-independence experience. The new country was almost torn apart by communist 
insurrection in the centre and ethnic insurgency in the periphery. The early years of 
parliamentary democracy were characterised by factionalism and infighting, which 
many in the Tatmadaw saw as driven by self-serving politicians having little regard for 
the national interest. The upshot is that many in the military remain distrustful of 
civilian politics. This, together with fears about instability at a time of major political 
change, mean that the Tatmadaw is not yet ready to give up constitutional prerogatives 
that ensure, through guaranteed legislative representation, that it has a veto on chang-
es to the charter, as well as control of key security ministries, among other things. 
Those guarantees, far from entrenching stasis, are what have given the Tatmadaw the 
confidence to allow – and in many cases support – a major liberalisation of politics and 
the economy, even when many of the changes impact on its interests. Its proportion 
of the government budget has been significantly reduced, the huge military-owned 
conglomerates have lost lucrative monopolies and other economic privileges, and 
the Tatmadaw is subject to increasing scrutiny, including from the recently unshack-
led media, on issues such as land confiscation and the way it operates in ethnic areas. 
Many observers have assumed that the Tatmadaw would be a spoiler on issues of 
key interest such as the peace process and economic reform. Yet, this has generally 
not been the case – although the military’s actions in Kachin State, including current 
deadly clashes, have been deeply troubling. The Tatmadaw’s support for progress in 
these areas stems from its broader concerns about protecting Myanmar’s sovereign-
ty and geo-strategic interests. Military leaders were deeply concerned in recent years 
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by the country’s growing reliance on China, both politically and economically, and 
were worried about how they would be able to balance the influence of their giant 
neighbour. They were also concerned that Myanmar was falling farther and farther 
behind the rest of the region economically, to them almost as an existential threat. 
They understood that rebooting the economy and building strategic relationships to 
balance China required engagement with the West that would only be possible if 
there were fundamental political reforms, as well as internal peace. 
The fact that this is a planned, top-down transition is one of the reasons why it 
has been relatively untumultuous and may prove to be a sustained opening of the 
country. Yet, there are many possible future scenarios. Tatmadaw backing for the 
transition is indispensible, but by no means unproblematic. It too must undergo major 
internal reforms, to modernise and professionalise, and to transform the practices 
and institutional culture that give rise to abuses of civilians. More fundamentally, it 
will have to change how it is viewed by many ethnic communities, from the enemy 
to a national security force that defends the interests of all Myanmar’s peoples. The 
new doctrine that the Tatmadaw is reportedly preparing may seek to address some 
of these issues, but little is known about the process of drafting it, nor its content. 
Much more will need to be done to address the military’s legacy of abuse. If it can 
provide security for civilians rather than presenting a threat – as it has been more 
successful in doing, compared with the police, in its response to communal violence 
– its presence may even be welcomed. 
The Tatmadaw’s constitutional prerogatives were no doubt critical in giving it 
the confidence to embark on this transition, and the commander-in-chief, Senior 
General Min Aung Hlaing, and key members of the political establishment have said 
that they will be gradually reduced. There is a strong possibility, however, that the 
military will want to preserve its political role longer than is healthy. If such undem-
ocratic provisions are in place for anything more than a short transitional period, 
they risk becoming entrenched, which would be deeply damaging to the country’s 
future – by entrenching a political role for the Tatmadaw, leaving it permanently 
outside civilian control and able to privilege its institutional interests at the expense 
of the country. 
II. Brief History of the Tatmadaw 
A. Origins 
The modern Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw in Burmese, emerged from the 
struggle against British colonialism and the Second World War.1 In December 1941, 
a group of young nationalists known as the “Thirty Comrades”, who had received 
military training from the Japanese, founded the Burma Independence Army. They 
 
 
1 For a detailed account of the origins of the Tatmadaw, see Mary Callahan, Making Enemies: War 
and State Building in Burma (Cornell, 2003), chapter 2. For previous Crisis Group reporting on 
Myanmar since the present government took power, see Asia Briefings N°142, Not a Rubber Stamp: 
Myanmar’s Legislature in a Time of Transition, 13 December 2013; N°140, A Tentative Peace in 
Myanmar’s Kachin Conflict, 12 June 2013; N°136, Reform in Myanmar: One Year On, 11 April 
2012; and N°127, Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, 22 September 2011; also Asia Reports 
N°251, The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar, 1 October 2013; 
N°238, Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon, 12 November 2012; N°231, Myanmar: The Poli-
tics of Economic Reform, 27 July 2012; and N°214, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, 30 No-
vember 2011. 
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were led by Aung San (Aung San Suu Kyi’s father) and followed the invading Japa-
nese army into Burma in its short campaign to drive out the British administration.2 
Over time, however, Burma Independence Army leaders became disillusioned 
with the Japanese, and began organising resistance, then revolted in March 1945 
and began fighting with allied forces during their reoccupation of the country. This 
set the stage for the nationalists to return home as liberators, and bolstered them in 
their efforts to achieve independence.3 
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, and in consultation with Aung San 
and other nationalist leaders, the British hastily reconstructed a national army, the 
Patriotic Burmese Forces. It was an uncomfortable amalgamation of two “wings”: 
one made up of nationalist Burman forces of the Burma Independence Army, and the 
other of non-Burman minority units from the old colonial army who had remained 
loyal to the British throughout the war.4 These two wings were not only antagonistic, 
they had very different military traditions and very different futures in mind for the 
country, which proved “almost fatal to the integrity of the army and independent 
Burma”.5 To make matters worse, Aung San, who was to lead the post-independence 
government, was assassinated by a political rival in July 1947, along with most of his 
cabinet. 
B. Post-Independence Turbulence 
At independence in January 1948, the army consisted of only fifteen battalions, or-
ganised along ethnic lines – “Burma rifles” battalions made up of Burman soldiers, 
along with “Karen Rifles”, “Kachin Rifles” and so on. Just a few months after inde-
pendence, three Burma rifles battalions mutinied and joined a communist rebellion, 
and in early 1949 a Karen armed rebellion was launched. The army was reduced to six 
front-line battalions consisting of less than 3,000 troops, and it lost control of much 
of the country beyond Yangon.6 The army, and the state itself, virtually collapsed. 
Slowly, however, the army managed to consolidate and expand its control, less by 
defeating the mutineers and insurgents, and more by co-opting or incorporating into 
its ranks local politically organised pocket armies, militias and bandits – who were 
loyal to the opposition Socialist Party or particular socialist politicians rather than to 
the Tatmadaw or the government as such.7 
As this more consolidated army emerged, the nationalist independence fighters 
became dominant in the Tatmadaw leadership, sidelining British-trained officers. 
Ne Win, a member of the Thirty Comrades who had fought with Aung San, was ap-
pointed supreme commander of the defence services in 1949, replacing General 
Smith Dun (an ethnic Karen). Ne Win set about strengthening the power of himself 
and his old Patriotic Burmese Forces comrades through a series of reshuffles and 
purges, as well as an ambitious upgrading and expansion of the armed forces.8 
Throughout the 1950s, civilian politics became increasingly fractious, with the 
party of Prime Minister Nu9 – the country’s first post-independence elected leader – 
 
 
2 The Burma Independence Army was reconstituted a few months later as the Burma Defence 
Army, and subsequently in 1943 as the Burma National Army. 
3 See Callahan, Making Enemies, op. cit., chapter 3. 
4 Ibid, chapter 4. 
5 Ibid, p. 96. 
6 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (EastBridge, 2001), chapter 7. 
7 Callahan, Making Enemies, op. cit., chapter 5. 
8 Ibid, chapter 6. 
9 Like many people in Myanmar, he went by one name. 
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factionalised and upcountry politicians continuing to be backed by private armies. 
These tensions were heightened further when the ruling party split into two factions, 
each of which tried to rally the support of local militias across the country. The army 
was more sympathetic to one of these factions, and when the other faction – led by 
Nu – looked likely to win elections in 1958, a military “caretaker government” was 
appointed, headed by Ne Win, in what was essentially a coup d’état.10 
C. A Military Takeover 
The military had come to regard civilian politicians as corrupt, self-serving and in-
competent, incapable of pursuing the national interest. The caretaker government 
assigned military officers to senior positions in the civil service and further expanded 
military institutions. It arrested many of Nu’s supporters and other critics, and cur-
tailed press freedoms. At the same time, many people welcomed the more efficient 
and less corrupt government that the military provided, and the fact that it was able 
to reduce violent crime and restore a measure of law and order. After eighteen months 
in power, the caretaker government arranged multi-party elections in 1960, which 
took place in nearly all the country thanks to the improved security, returning Burma 
to civilian rule again under Prime Minister Nu. Most of the officers assigned to the 
civil service returned to the military. General Ne Win was lauded internationally for 
his democratic principles.11 
Civilian rule was not to last long, however. Many in the military were unhappy 
that Nu had returned to power, and their unease was amplified when he immediately 
set about dismantling many of the structures and reversing policies put in place by 
the caretaker government. After only a few weeks in office, his faction of the party 
split again, leaving him weakened and his government disorganised. At the same 
time, Ne Win embarked on a restructuring and strengthening of the Tatmadaw, cre-
ating a unified chain of command under his firm control.12 
In 1962, against the backdrop of renewed political infighting, continued insurgency 
in the countryside and concerns that Shan State, in particular, might exercise its con-
stitutional right to secession, the Tatmadaw staged another coup. It took over the key 
strategic locations in Yangon and other cities, and arrested the main government 
leaders. This time, there was to be no return to civilian rule. A “Revolutionary Coun-
cil” was established to run the country, under the leadership of Ne Win. The consti-
tution was abrogated and all legislative, executive and judicial power placed in Ne 
Win’s hands. Radical economic and social policies were instituted with the aim of 
creating a socialist state isolated from outside influences. A political party (the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party, BSPP) and mass peasant and worker organisations were 
created to promote socialist ideology. 
The Revolutionary Council tackled the perceived failures of the democratic period 
by banning political parties (except the BSPP), taking control of all media, publish-
ers and printers and curtailing civil liberties. It addressed its fears over the unity of 
the state by abolishing the limited autonomy and local government that some ethnic 
areas enjoyed. Ethnic rights were framed in terms of putative equality of all minori-
ties within a unitary state. 
 
 
10 Callahan, Making Enemies, op. cit., chapter 7. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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These policies, far from containing insurgency and ethnic demands, only served to 
exacerbate them. Economic chaos resulting from a radical nationalisation policy made 
things worse. While the Tatmadaw was able to assert more control over the central 
plains, communist and ethnic insurgency spread rapidly in the rest of the country.13 
D. A Socialist One-Party State 
A new constitution was adopted in 1974. It established a socialist one-party state, 
with effectively no separation of powers – and certainly no right for ethnic states to 
secede. The unicameral legislature elected a small group of its members to a Council 
of State that ran the country, headed by a president that it selected from among its 
members. Elections were held the same year, with candidates drawn almost exclu-
sively from the BSPP. Ne Win, who had already given up his military position, became 
president; many of the other military officers who made up the Revolutionary Coun-
cil were appointed, as civilians, to the Council of State. Ne Win relinquished the 
presidency in 1981, but remained chairman of the BSPP. 
The Tatmadaw consolidated its control of the central parts of Myanmar, by offer-
ing amnesties to insurgent groups operating there, and driving the rest into the bor-
derlands, using the brutally effective “four-cuts” counter-insurgency strategy. The 
aim of this strategy was to deny insurgents the support from populations that they 
needed to survive, by cutting them off from food, funds, intelligence and recruits. The 
Tatmadaw would cordon off one area at a time, flood it with troops, relocate popu-
lations into “strategic villages” in areas under firm government control, control the 
food supply, and then repeat the process in the adjacent area.14 
Having pacified the centre, the focus of military operations then shifted to the 
border areas. The four-cuts strategy was far less effective in this harsh and unfamiliar 
terrain, where ethnic insurgents could disappear in impenetrable jungle or use in-
ternational borders as “back-door” supply lines and escape routes.15 The Tatmadaw 
fought to a deadlock, and there was a perception among combat soldiers that the 
remoteness of these new campaigns from the country’s political power centres meant 
that they received less attention from the government, and less resources.16 Through-
out the 1970s and 1980s, much of the borderlands continued to be under the control 
of ethnic armies (in the north, these ethnic forces were organised into a powerful 
Chinese-backed communist insurgency); for its part, the 186,000-strong national 
army was regarded as poorly funded and poorly equipped.17 
E. A Failed Uprising 
In 1987, years of economic decline and increasing hardship eventually led to student 
protests, the trigger being the government’s decision to demonetise much of the cur-
rency without warning or compensation by invalidating high-denomination bank 
notes. The following year saw a near total collapse of law and order, with demonstra-
tions across the country, violence increasing, and many state institutions ceasing to 
 
 
13 See Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Zed Books, 1999), 2nd edi-
tion, chapter 12. 
14 Ibid, pp. 258-262; Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, op. cit., pp. 90-92; Callahan, Making Enemies, 
op. cit., pp. 210-214; and Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces 
Since 1948 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), chapter 2. 
15 Smith, op. cit., p. 261. 
16 Callahan, Making Enemies, op. cit., p. 210. 
17 Ibid. 
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function. Ne Win resigned as BSPP chairman in July, but this only increased popular 
demands for fundamental reform, something the BSPP seemed incapable of con-
ceiving, much less implementing. 
A nationwide strike on 8 August 1988 brought huge crowds onto the streets, ef-
forts by the administration to control the situation failed, and the use of indiscrimi-
nate violence by the security forces led to thousands of deaths. On 18 September, the 
military seized power, swiftly and violently cleared demonstrators from the streets 
and established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a group of 
military officers under the leadership of General Saw Maung, to rule the country. It 
set about addressing what it saw as the major reasons behind the uprising: an eco-
nomic crisis caused by a failed socialist system, and a leadership crisis characterised 
by the idiosyncratic decision-making of a disconnected autocrat. The BSPP was 
dissolved, the 1974 constitution was abrogated, and a nominally market-oriented 
economic policy announced. The SLORC held all executive, legislative and judicial 
powers. It committed itself to collective decision-making – although it was not to be 
long before a new dictator, General Than Shwe, consolidated control. 
This group of younger military officers embarked on a rapid enlargement and 
modernisation of the Tatmadaw, and more vigorously pursued the goal of bringing 
the borderlands under central control to achieve “national reconsolidation”. This 
was carried out through a combination of more concerted military operations against 
ethnic areas and ceasefire deals with individual armed groups. The attitude of neigh-
bouring countries also adapted to the new post-Cold War realities, and these coun-
tries began to place higher priority on good relations with Yangon, and put increasing 
pressure on ethnic armed groups to reach ceasefire agreements with the regime.  
A key development occurred in 1989, when ethnic minority troops in the north 
east of the country mutinied against the largely Burman leadership of the Com-
munist Party of Burma, causing it to collapse. The troops formed several new organi-
sations along ethnic lines. The SLORC was quick to seize the opportunity, offering 
advantageous ceasefire agreements to the new groups, thereby neutralising its largest 
military threat. These initial ceasefires freed the Tatmadaw to increase the military 
pressure on other ethnic armed groups, and over the next few years, many agreed 
ceasefires.18 By 1999, the army had doubled in size to some 370,000 troops, and 
could call on an increasing range of more modern weapons systems.19 
III. Architects of Reform? 
A. What the Military Wanted 
The SLORC claimed after the 1988 coup that it was a temporary government that 
would stabilise the political and security situation, then return power to civilian hands 
(at least partially). It held elections in 1990 that were probably intended to do so, but 
it was apparently shocked by the National League for Democracy’s landslide, and the 
results were never implemented – instead, the military continued its dictatorial rule, 
keeping Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and imprisoning many other leaders 
of her party.20 
 
 
18 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°52, Ethnic Minority Politics, 7 May 2003. 
19 Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 79. 
20 For analysis, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°11, Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military 
Regime?, 21 December 2000. 
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Initial attempts to open the country up and reform the economy did not achieve 
much traction – due to a lack of political will to take some of the bold steps needed, a 
lack of capacity and vision, and a lack of international appetite for forging relations 
with a regime that had come to power by brutally supressing peaceful demonstrations.21 
Moves toward reform were also complicated by internal regime dynamics. Efforts 
to open up the country in the early 2000s were spearheaded by General Khin Nyunt, 
the powerful intelligence chief. However, they came to an abrupt end when he and 
his entire intelligence apparatus were purged in 2004 – ostensibly for corruption, 
but seemingly also out of fear that he was becoming too powerful. It was several 
more years before the regime reactivated its “roadmap to disciplined democracy”, 
adopting a new constitution in 2008 and holding elections in 2010 that brought the 
current reformist government to power. 
With a new, younger generation of officers at the helm, the Tatmadaw allowed, sup-
ported and in some cases advocated major reforms – including those that impacted 
its economic interests.22 The reasons why the Tatmadaw would move the country 
toward reform and democratisation, after decades of control and oppression, remain 
somewhat uncertain. However, interviews with individuals closely connected to the 
reform process – at the time the new government took office, and subsequently – 
suggest that two key factors played a role:23 
 The China factor. Myanmar’s political and economic isolation following the 1988 
coup drove it into the arms of China – who provided political protection, including 
crucially in the UN Security Council, and was a key source of credit and investment. 
However, this unbalancing of Myanmar’s external relations was of considerable 
concern to many in the political elite. Myanmar has traditionally been extremely 
concerned about being overwhelmed by its giant neighbour, and wanted a strate-
gic counterbalance outside the region, a role that could only really be filled by the 
U.S. The military regime understood that it would not be possible to build a stra-
tegic relationship with the U.S. without major reform. 
 The economic-security factor. By the time of the transition in 2011, it had become 
increasingly clear to the elites just how far Myanmar was falling behind the rest of 
the region economically. This ever-widening gap – not just with the richer countries 
in the region, but even the poorest24 – was not only a source of shame and an in-
dictment of the way the country was being run; it came to be seen as an existential 
threat. How could Myanmar ensure its security and sovereignty when it was so far 
behind the region technologically and economically? Yet, it was recognised that 
rebooting the economy required expertise and investment from the West, which 
would not be forthcoming without credible political and governance reforms. 
These two factors appear to have been key in creating the recognition among a ma-
jority of Myanmar’s military-political elites of the need for fundamental economic 
and political change. This meant that when the transition took place, there was con-
siderable pent-up desire for reform, and a willingness within the military to give up 
 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Section III.C below. 
23 Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar individuals close to the reforms and to the military elites, 
2011-2014. 
24 According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2010 Myanmar’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita was around half that of the next poorest countries in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Laos and Cambodia. 
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some benefits in the service of the economic health of the nation, which is also seen 
as a means to ensure its own longer-term security.25 
The Tatmadaw has had a key role in driving the recent political and economic 
reforms and the peace process, but there are also highly problematic aspects of its 
activities and engagement in these three areas. 
B. The Military’s Political Role 
The transition from a military regime to a semi-civilian government has, almost by 
definition, required that the Tatmadaw cede considerable political authority to civil-
ian institutions. It is no longer in charge of most aspects of day-to-day government, 
which represents a significant reduction in its political authority – both over govern-
ment decision-making on everything from energy to foreign affairs to land policy, but 
also its control over and dominance within the civil service. It no longer has the same 
freedom to transfer military officers into senior civil service posts; such transfers 
have markedly declined since 2011.26 This also has economic consequences, since the 
Tatmadaw no longer controls policy decisions that in the past gave it access to huge 
economic rents – control of trade policy and import licences, decisions over govern-
ment contracts, and so on (see Section III.C below). 
The situation at the national level is mirrored at the regional level. Previously, 
regional commanders wielded absolute authority in their areas, since they served 
simultaneously as military chiefs and heads of regional governments. They now play 
no role in local administration, other than on security matters, reducing their au-
thority and access to economic rents. 
At the same time, the Tatmadaw retains enormous constitutional and de facto 
political power. It has five of the eleven seats on the powerful National Defence and 
Security Council, which currently meets almost weekly and has peak decision-making 
authority over matters such as granting of amnesties, appointment of the command-
er-in-chief and states of emergency.27 The Tatmadaw’s 25 per cent bloc of legislative 
seats gives it the power to veto constitutional changes, and the ability to influence, 
but not determine, the outcome of legislative deliberations. It has considerable con-
stitutional autonomy in deciding military and security matters, largely free from civil-
ian oversight – the commander-in-chief is a military officer, not the president, and the 
ministers of defence, home affairs and border affairs are serving military officers 
appointed by the commander-in-chief. In addition to these formal powers, the size, 
strength and recent pre-eminence of the institution gives it major de facto authority 
wherever it chooses to assert it. 
 
 
25 For detailed analysis, see Crisis Group Report, The Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit., Section 
IV.B. 
26 There have been a small number of transfers from the military to the foreign ministry in recent 
months, and the transfer of several serving military officers to ambassadorships. A number of mili-
tary officers have also been assigned as mid-level staff of the Union Election Commission. Previously 
such transfers to the civil service were the norm, but are now exceptional enough to be remarked on and 
stir some controversy. Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar think-tank analyst, and Myanmar indi-
vidual with detailed knowledge of military affairs, Yangon, January 2014. See also Priscilla Clapp 
and Aung Din, “Myanmar’s government appoints military to the election commission”, cogitASIA 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies), 28 January 2014. 
27 As provided for in the constitution, the National Defence and Security Council consists of the 
president, the two vice presidents, the speakers of the two legislative chambers, the commander-in-
chief and his deputy, and the ministers for defence, home affairs, border affairs and foreign affairs. 
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Most of these powers are in the form of guarantees to the Tatmadaw that its core 
functions will not be encroached on by civilian government, and that in extreme sit-
uations it has the power to ensure that its essential interests will not be threatened. 
They are undemocratic, but may have been considered by the architects of the con-
stitution as necessary to ensure that the Tatmadaw would be confident to relinquish 
its other powers. If entrenched for anything more than a short transitional period, 
they could be deeply damaging to the future prospects of the country. It would per-
petuate a political role for the Tatmadaw, leaving it permanently outside civilian con-
trol. This would enable it to privilege its institutional interests at the expense of the 
country, and it cannot be taken for granted that it would continue to support liberal-
isation in the future. 
C. The Military’s Economic Role 
The Tatmadaw has long had a dominant economic role in Myanmar. This stems from 
two factors:28 
 The military regime presided over a licence-and-permit economy where key eco-
nomic activities, including import and export, required permission from a policy 
body (the Trade Council) chaired by the army commander.29 Similarly, decisions 
on government contracts were non-transparent and decided by the regime. This 
provided significant opportunities for obtaining economic rents, and for privileg-
ing the interests of Tatmadaw businesses. 
 Economic decision-making more generally was under the control of the regime, 
rather than technocrats in the relevant ministries; economists and other experts 
– whether inside or outside government – rarely had significant input into policy-
making. In particular, the most lucrative sectors of the economy were reserved for 
a Tatmadaw-owned holding company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Hold-
ings Limited (UMEHL), which is headed by the adjutant general. Any other com-
pany, including foreign companies, wishing to enter these sectors was required 
to form a joint venture with UMEHL. The sectors in which UMEHL had effective 
monopolies included tobacco products, alcohol, the rice trade and imports of 
vehicles, refined petroleum products and edible oils. 
The special economic role of the Tatmadaw and its holding companies has been sig-
nificantly weakened as a result of both the economic and political reforms. The polit-
ical reforms mean that the military no longer has control over key economic policy 
decisions. The Trade Council has been abolished, the system of licences that it ad-
ministered is being rolled back, and decisions made in a more transparent way by 
technocrats. The Tatmadaw is out of day-to-day government, and so is no longer in a 
position to be gatekeeper of the economy.30 
Specific decisions have also been taken to try to level the economic playing field, 
and these have direct impact on the Tatmadaw’s business interests. According to 
individuals close to the issue, the most significant immediate impact was from the 
decision, taken by the new government a few months after it took office in 2011, to 
revoke the tax-free status of the Tatmadaw’s holding companies (UMEHL and the 
 
 
28 For more details, see Crisis Group Report, Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit. 
29 The Trade Council was chaired by General Maung Aye, who was the SPDC vice chairman and the 
army’s commander-in-chief. 
30 Ibid. 
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Myanmar Economic Corporation, MEC). This applied not only to corporate tax, but 
also import and export taxes. Prior to this, many companies that were required to pay 
export taxes (at 10 per cent) would conduct their export activities through UMEHL, 
who would take a 5 per cent cut. The scale of this tax avoidance scheme was said to be 
huge. Thus, the ending of their tax exemption caused an immediate loss to UMEHL 
of a very lucrative revenue stream.31 
The military conglomerates have also lost their monopolies. The first to go, a few 
weeks after the new government took power, was that on edible oil imports – a sector 
that UMEHL had controlled since 1999. An indication of the profit margins involved 
was that, within weeks, prices had dropped 30 per cent. Vehicle imports were opened 
up later in 2011, and there is now competition in all of the formerly monopolised 
sectors.32 
There are serious questions as to whether UMEHL can remain profitable without 
the political and economic advantages it previously enjoyed, or whether it could start 
to become a drain on the Tatmadaw’s finances. It still has significant resources: huge 
land assets, factories, market access and distribution networks. This means that it 
will continue to have a sizeable footprint in the economy. But whether it can leverage 
these resources into huge profits is less clear. While its land holdings are greatly in-
creasing in value, its enterprises are regarded as inefficient and poorly managed, and 
in the new environment, it would likely not be the preferred joint venture partner for 
most international enterprises. Further, it is already embroiled in a number of con-
tractual disputes with international and local partners.33 
Why would the Tatmadaw accept to have its economic power curtailed in such a 
way? First, economic reform was seen as vital to the future of the Tatmadaw and the 
country by the military-political elites, and some loss of privilege was inevitable. 
Secondly, much of the revenue from military business does not flow to the Tatmadaw 
itself – UMEHL mostly finances its shareholders (in the main, retired senior military 
officers) and the military’s pension fund. Thus, loss of revenue is not a big hit for the 
military budget; the cost is more to retired senior commanders, who are more of a 
political threat to the new commander-in-chief that he may want to weaken, rather 
than a core constituency. Thirdly, the military conglomerates risk becoming a loss-
making burden in a new economic environment, and the commander-in-chief may 
prefer the predictability of national budget allocations. The Tatmadaw’s budget has 
been declining as a proportion of the budget, but the total government budget, and 
hence the real-terms military allocation, can be expected to increase (see Section IV.D 
below). For all these reasons, the Tatmadaw has likely concluded that there is much 
to be gained from supporting economic reform. 
D. The Military’s Role in the Peace Process 
In addition to the major political and economic transitions, the other far-reaching 
reform initiated by the current government has been the peace process with some 
sixteen ethnic armed groups. The aim is to bring to a close six decades of deadly con-
flict – the longest running civil war in the world – through ceasefires followed by 
 
 
31 Ibid. Also, Crisis Group interview, Myanmar individual with detailed knowledge of military affairs, 
Yangon, January 2014. 
32 Crisis Group Report, Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit. 
33 “Myanmar Economic Holdings in brewery contract dispute”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 30 
August 2013; and “Arbiter slams UMEHL over foul play”, Myanmar Times, 17 March 2014. 
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political dialogue.34 This process, particularly the ceasefires and associated security 
agreements, directly involves the Tatmadaw, and can provide good indications of how 
it sees its current and future role in the country.35 
The Tatmadaw has expressed public support for the peace process. The com-
mander-in-chief endorsed the president’s approach in his Armed Forces Day speech 
in March 2012, and again in 2013.36 In his 27 March 2014 speech, he stressed that 
Myanmar could not develop as a country without peace, and highlighted the im-
portance of achieving a nationwide ceasefire agreement, through which the armed 
groups “would be legalized”.37 
The Tatmadaw has been actively involved in the peace negotiations. It has sent 
high-level representatives to the talks, whose role has generally been perceived as 
constructive, even if some armed group leaders find it difficult to have trust in the 
army’s intentions and sincerity. The Tatmadaw was particularly engaged in the 9-10 
March 2014 peace talks in Yangon that brought together representatives of the ethnic 
armed groups with those from the different branches of government and the military. 
Present at the meeting were five Tatmadaw generals, who were very well prepared 
and actively participated in the discussions – something ethnic leaders saw as indi-
cating openness and solution-oriented thinking.38 The same was true at the 5-6 April 
peace talks in Yangon. The Tatmadaw has apparently accepted the idea of some form 
of federalism as part of a solution to the conflicts, though it remains resistant to the 
use of the word in the nationwide ceasefire agreement. Previously, it had been vehe-
mently opposed to any moves toward federalism, regarding them as a prelude to the 
break-up of the country.39 
The major concerns about the Tatmadaw’s role in the peace process have focused 
on its conduct in Kachin and Shan States. In Kachin State, there has been fierce 
fighting with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) over the last three years, 
even after the president called a unilateral halt to offensive actions.40 Although an 
uneasy peace now prevails, there are occasional and sometimes serious clashes.41 
Similarly, there are sporadic skirmishes between the Tatmadaw and armed groups in 
Shan State, not only with KIO troops in the north of the state, but also with the Shan 
State Progress Party (Shan State Army-North) and the Restoration Council for Shan 
State (Shan State Army-South).42 
 
 
34 The Karen National Union, for example, has been fighting since 1949. 
35 For an early overview, see Crisis Group Report, A New Peace Initiative, op. cit. 
36 New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2012, p. 1; and 28 March 2013, p. 1. 
37 New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2014, p. 1; see also “Army chief says ethnic conflicts must end 
for Burma’s development”, The Irrawaddy, 27 March 2014. 
38 Crisis Group interviews, armed group leaders, Chiang Mai, December 2013 and Yangon, October 
2013; member of the government peace team, January 2014; and individual present at the peace 
talks, March 2014. 
39 For a discussion of the Tatmadaw’s earlier concerns, see Crisis Group Report, New Peace Initia-
tive, op. cit., Section IV.E. 
40 For a detailed discussion of the Kachin conflict and the peace parley, see Crisis Group Briefing, 
A Tentative Peace in Myanmar’s Kachin Conflict, op. cit. 
41 See, for example, “Fighting dashes hopes of homecoming for displaced in Kachin”, The Irrawaddy, 
20 February 2014. 
42 See, for example, “SSA-North writes to peace team over clashes”, Myanmar Times, 7 August 
2013; “Burma Army clashes with SSA-S, TNLA in Shan State”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 Feb-
ruary 2014. Sporadic clashes also take place in Shan State with the Ta’ang National Liberation 
Army, which has not yet entered into a ceasefire. 
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Such clashes have led some people to question the Tatmadaw’s motives and its 
genuine commitment to the peace process. Indeed, attacks on KIO areas in late 2012 
and early 2013 were of a scale and intensity that was inconsistent with the pres-
ident’s order to only take action in self-defence – even if it were the case, as the 
Tatmadaw claimed, that it was acting to protect its supply lines at a time when KIO 
ambushes were causing it mounting casualties. Yet, it is not clear that these attacks 
were aimed at undermining the chances of peace, as some have suggested. It should be 
noted that they took place at a time when ceasefire negotiations between the govern-
ment and the KIO were stalled, and when the KIO had not stopped its own attacks 
on government forces. 
In Shan State, the security situation is complex, and there can be many reasons 
for clashes, some of which may be the responsibility of the Tatmadaw, but others 
not. There are many armed groups moving in these areas, including criminal gangs 
involved in banditry and drug smuggling; it is often difficult to be sure who is who. 
Armed elements on both sides are often in close proximity without clear demarca-
tion, creating a risk of clashes. In addition, different armed groups and the Tatmadaw 
engage in illegal income generation activities. This can lead to tensions and clashes 
over who has access to resources, or when the Tatmadaw attempts to crack down on 
such activity by others. The fact that the Shan State Army-South continues to be 
strongly supportive of the peace process is in part due to the fact that it recognises 
the sporadic clashes are a reflection of the complex situation on the ground.43 
What is clear is that if the Tatmadaw as an institution really wanted to undermine 
the peace process, it could easily do so in Kayin State or other areas where ceasefires 
are in place and holding. The fact that it has not done so, and indeed, that relations 
with these armed groups – most notably, the Karen National Union (KNU) – con-
tinue to be positive, indicates a commitment to ensuring that these ceasefires are 
maintained. The KNU leadership has been meeting on average every two months 
with the president and with the commander-in-chief, to discuss issues related to the 
ceasefire as well as the peace process more generally. These top-level meetings, to-
gether with more regular interactions at lower levels, have ensured that there are 
avenues to address problems with the ceasefire as they arise. 
IV. The Tatmadaw in a Future Democratic Myanmar 
A. Adapting to the New Realities 
A major shift is taking place in the role that the Tatmadaw plays in the life of the 
country. In the transition from military regime to semi-civilian administration, the 
Tatmadaw has stepped back from running government, other than the key security 
sectors of defence, home affairs and border affairs. It has to adapt itself to a more 
democratic situation, where it still wields enormous power, but where there are new 
constraints on how it can exercise that power, and it is exposed to some degree of 
public and media scrutiny when it does so. To take one example, it is being criticised 
 
 
43 According to a spokesperson of the group, “as there was no specific demarcation, we continue to 
move about in the region normally, and at times we run into government army columns”, he said. 
“Without clear boundaries and advance notice, mobilisation can lead to ‘brief, pre-emptive clash-
es’”, he added. “But we have not seen large-scale fighting taking place”. Quoted in “Burma Army 
clashes with SSA-S, TNLA in Shan State”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 26 February 2014. 
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in the domestic media for land grabs, protests by the dispossessed are widely cov-
ered, and the issue has been before a legislative committee.44 
This adaptation is gradual, and sometimes uncomfortable for military officers – 
even if there is general acceptance of the need for it. They can no longer order civil-
ians to do their bidding in the same way that they were once able to, and the Tat-
madaw has committed itself, for example, to a time-bound plan to end the practice 
of forced labour.45 In the past, the military confiscated vast tracts of land, not only 
for army bases, but also prime agricultural land and land to be used for income gen-
eration activities or leased to developers. Now, it faces scrutiny for such past actions, 
and even demonstrations by the dispossessed, demanding restitution or compensa-
tion.46 In total, the Tatmadaw has announced that it will return to the original owners 
over 150,000 acres of confiscated farmland – which gives some idea of the massive 
scale of past confiscations.47 
In the past, the Tatmadaw also played a major role in keeping dissent in check, with 
troops rather than police being generally deployed to crack down on demonstrations 
or deal with social unrest. In the new order, troops in central Myanmar have mostly 
withdrawn to the barracks, leaving the police – sometimes without the necessary 
training, equipment or experience – to deal with these issues. In line with the consti-
tution, the military takes a direct role only if a state of emergency is declared, as it 
was in Rakhine State in 2012, for example. 
However, there are indications that the Tatmadaw may be shifting to a somewhat 
more proactive stance. At the time of the three days of anti-Muslim violence in Meik-
tila in March 2013, many observers questioned why the military had not stepped in to 
quell the violence and restore order. Meiktila has a large military contingent, being 
home to Myanmar’s main air force base as well as the 99th Light Infantry Division, a 
mobile “rapid reaction” force. The military played no role in tackling the incident 
until the president declared a state of emergency on the third day of violence.48 
On 26 March 2014, a Rakhine census boycott in Sittwe turned into two days of 
violence directed at international NGOs and the UN – leading to the destruction and 
looting of offices and the evacuation of most of their staff.49 In his annual Armed 
Forces Day speech the following day, the commander-in-chief “called on all people 
to cooperate with the Tatmadaw as the armed forces are assisting the police in the 
enforcement of rule of law”.50 This was an indication that the military was ready to 
be much more proactive on public order issues than it had been in the recent past, 
while still framing it as “support to the police” since no state of emergency was de-
clared. The army took up a visible presence on the streets of Sittwe and a top com-
 
 
44 See, for example, “Commission to investigate Migyaungkan land grabbing”, Eleven Myanmar, 
9 April 2014; “Military involved in massive land grabs: Parliamentary report”, The Irrawaddy, 
5 March 2013. 
45 See “Developments concerning the question of the observance by the Government of Myanmar of 
the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)”, ILO document GB.313/INS/6(Add.), 19 March 2012. 
46 See, for example, “Michaungkan villagers restart sit-in protest”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 27 
March 2014; “Tenasserim villagers protest military land grab”, Democratic Voice of Burma, 21 Feb-
ruary 2014; “Land protest leaves one dead, dozens injured”, The Irrawaddy, 27 February 2013. 
47 See “Army to return 150,000 acres to original owners”, Myanmar Times, 9 February 2014. 
48 See Crisis Group Report, The Dark Side of Transition, op. cit. 
49 “Humanitarian crisis looms in western Burma as foreign aid workers leave”, Reuters, 1 April 2014. 
50 “Commander-in-chief says armed forces responsible for ‘safeguarding constitution’ as 69th 
Armed Forces Day is marked with parade”, New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2014, pp. 1, 3. 
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mander – General Hla Htay Win, the joint chief of staff and third-ranking officer in 
the Tatmadaw – was sent to oversee the security operation.51  
The army also provided security in parts of Rakhine for the census enumeration 
that took place a few days later, and also – much more problematically – in Kachin 
State. There is a sense that this more proactive approach may be driven in part by that 
fact that the Tatmadaw has always prided itself on its capacity to restore and main-
tain security.52 During the state of emergency in Rakhine in 2012, the military was 
far more effective than the police had been in restoring order and protecting Muslim 
Rohingya villages, and those communities generally saw its role as positive.53 In some 
instances, particularly Rakhine State, it may be the best option in the short term for 
preventing the situation escalating to widespread insecurity and violence. 
The role of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s borderlands is also shifting. The cease-
fires in place in most of these areas mean that it has less need for patrols and security 
operations, and units are spending more time in barracks. The new political and se-
curity context implies a radical shift in the nature of its interactions with civilians in 
border areas – a shift that is far from being fully realised, with abuses still taking place. 
But ending abusive practices is only a part of the transition that the Tatmadaw must 
make. If Myanmar is to be successful in building a genuine union based on respect 
for diversity and greater autonomy, the Tatmadaw will have to find a way to change 
from being seen as the enemy by many ethnic communities (which it has been for 
multiple generations) to a national security force that reflects the diversity of the 
country and its peoples. 
B. A New Military Doctrine 
Improving the Tatmadaw’s reputation in the country, particularly in ethnic commu-
nities, will be an enormous challenge. It requires a major effort to address abuses of 
civilians – which have been documented in detail over decades – including through 
training and changes in military culture, as well as steps to end impunity.54 At a 
broader level, it must be addressed through the elaboration of a new military doc-
trine. Since independence, in developing its doctrine the Tatmadaw has felt the need 
to balance the competing demands of perceived external threats (which required heavy 
weapons systems for conventional operations) and active insurgencies (which required 
a large, lightly-equipped force).55 The initial focus after independence was on the 
former, although the country lacked the resources necessary to follow this through. 
Given the large-scale insurgencies of the 1950s, when the military took power in 1962 
it shifted focus mainly to the latter, in the form of a “people’s war” concept – a counter-
insurgency doctrine that involved the establishment of local militias and ultimately 
the brutal four-cuts strategy. 
 
 
51 “General Hla Htay Win inspects riot-affected areas in Rakhine State”, New Light of Myanmar, 
29 March 2014, p. 3. 
52 Crisis Group interview, international analyst who had recent discussions with the authorities on 
the issue, Yangon, April 2014. 
53 See Crisis Group Report, Storm Clouds on the Horizon, op. cit., Section I.E. 
54 These have included serious violations in the context of counter-insurgency operations, as well as 
more systemic abuses including forced labour, arbitrary detention, illegal taxation and sexual vio-
lence, among others. 
55 For detailed discussion, see Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, op. cit., Section 4.3; and Maung Aung 
Myoe, op. cit., chapter 2. 
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The third phase of military doctrine was developed after the 1988 military takeover, 
and involved a modernisation of the weapons systems, but also a rapid expansion in 
the number of troops with the aim of enhancing counter-insurgency operations. In 
addition to external and internal military threats, in light of the 1988 demonstra-
tions this new doctrine also saw domestic political conflict as a threat.56 This led to a 
major expansion of the military intelligence service. At a time of deep economic ma-
laise, there was a lack of necessary resources to achieve this, and the army adopted a 
“self-reliance strategy” for units in the field. This resulted in large-scale abuses such 
as land confiscation, informal taxation and forced labour.57 
In a new sign of openness on defence matters, the defence ministry announced in 
the state media in February 2014 that it had established a new subcommittee that 
would take suggestions on defence matters from the public and invited such sugges-
tions to be submitted through phone, fax and email channels that were provided in 
the notice.58 
The reform process and civilianisation of government has prompted the Tatmadaw 
to engage in its fourth phase of doctrinal development.59 Little is known about the 
details. However, it is clear why the Tatmadaw would feel the need to update its doc-
trine. The new political environment gives the institution an opportunity to regain 
some of the respect it once had, at least in Burman circles.60 The withdrawal of the 
military from government, the marked reduction in internal conflict as a result of the 
peace process, and the fact that it no longer has the leading role in public order and 
political intelligence gathering gives it the possibility to streamline, professionalise, 
and modernise. This can be seen in the major “green-to-blue” transfer of soldiers 
into the police force, the reduction in cadet intakes by the military academies, and 
efforts to end the recruitment of children.61 
C. The Military Budget 
The new political environment has also had financial implications for the Tatmadaw. 
Shifting budgetary priorities and a more transparent legislative process mean that the 
military no longer has first call on the exchequer. Since budgets were not published 
for many years under the military regime, it was never clear what share the military 
received; estimates for the 1990s ranged as high as 40 per cent (and even more if extra-
budgetary sources were included), and closer to 20 per cent in the 1980s.62 Further-
 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 See Richard Horsey, Ending Forced Labour in Myanmar (Routledge, 2011), p. 85. 
58 New Light of Myanmar, 16 February 2014, p. 16. 
59 Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar sources with direct knowledge of the issue, Yangon, January 
2014. See also Mary Callahan, “The generals loosen their grip”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 23, no. 4 
(October 2012). 
60 A recent public opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute across Myanmar 
suggests that the military may not be viewed as negatively as had been supposed. It was the second 
most favourably viewed institution (after the media), with one third of respondents “very favoura-
ble” and more than half “favourable” – putting it ahead of the opposition, government, legislature, 
police, courts and political parties. “Survey of Burma public opinion”, International Republican In-
stitute, 2014. 
61 See Andrew Selth, Police Reform in Burma (Myanmar): Aims, Obstacles and Outcomes (Griffith 
Asia Institute, 2013) and Burma’s Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming (Grif-
fith Asia Institute, 2013); and “Myanmar commits to child-free armed forces”, UN Press Release, 
27 June 2012. 
62 See Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, op. cit., chapter 6. 
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more, the Tatmadaw attempted to insulate itself from budgetary fluctuations and 
uncertainties by developing its own military enterprises to ensure cheap and unin-
terrupted supplies of essential commodities – such as steel, cement, rebar and vehicle 
tyres – that are now mostly controlled by its Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) 
conglomerate.63 
Under the present government, military spending has been cut significantly. In the 
current fiscal year (2014-2015), it stands at 12 per cent of the budget, following an-
nual reductions from 19 per cent in the 2011 fiscal year.64 It is still higher than health 
and education combined, however. 
Although the Tatmadaw’s proportion of government expenditure is reducing, the 
impact of this depends partly on economic performance and the government’s ability 
to improve revenue collection. If the economy continues to grow and government 
spending to increase, the Tatmadaw may see its budget continue to increase in real 
terms.65 
D. The Tatmadaw’s Constitutional Role 
More fundamentally, the Tatmadaw must think through how it will transition to a 
future more democratic context where it will have to come increasingly under civil-
ian control. It is clear that any such transition will be slow and cautious, but the 
Tatmadaw leadership also appears to view it as inevitable and possibly even as being 
in the long-term interests of the institution, provided that the reform process remains 
stable. 
First, the transition to a more democratic, civilian-controlled military will be slow, 
because the Tatmadaw appears determined not to give up its considerable constitu-
tional powers for the time being. The commander-in-chief has strongly signalled 
that he is not in favour now of changing the amendment procedures in the constitu-
tion.66 The National League for Democracy and others are calling for the threshold 
for approving amendments to be reduced from three quarters to two thirds, so that 
the Tatmadaw’s 25 per cent of legislative seats would no longer give it a veto.67 Both 
the commander-in-chief and the president have recently said that the Tatmadaw still 
has an important role to play in the political transition.68 Security sector reform in 
transitional and conflict-affected countries always takes a long time, and even more 
 
 
63 See Crisis Group Report, Politics of Economic Reform, op. cit. 
64 “Military spending still dwarfs education and health”, Myanmar Times, 30 March 2014. 
65 Between 2011 and 2014, Myanmar’s GDP increased by an estimated 7.5 per cent per annum, and 
defence expenditure, although proportionally less, increased in real terms. See “Myanmar: Second 
review under the staff-monitored program”, IMF Country Report No. 14/91, 18 February 2014. 
66 See, for example, “Commander-in-chief says armed forces responsible for ‘safeguarding constitu-
tion’ as 69th Armed Forces Day is marked with parade”, New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2014, 
pp. 1, 3. 
67 See “Committee to target military veto”, Myanmar Times, 24 February 2014; and “Constitution 
body takes military veto off the table”, Myanmar Times, 14 March 2014. 
68 See “Army chief says ethnic conflicts must end for Burma’s development”, The Irrawaddy, 
27 March 2014; and “President marks 3rd anniversary of the government with speech: Six-decade 
long civil war to end soon, but armed forces will continue to be included in negotiations to solve po-
litical issues”, New Light of Myanmar, 27 March 2014, p. 1. 
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so in Myanmar given the pre-eminence of the Tatmadaw in the past, and the consti-
tutional guarantees that it currently enjoys.69 
Secondly, the transition to a more democratic military is inevitable, because the 
Tatmadaw has given clear indications that it does not view its constitutional pre-
rogatives as permanent, and other members of the political establishment have said 
they should be phased out as democracy takes root. In his 2014 Armed Forces Day 
speech, the commander-in-chief indicated the need for a “gradual reduction” in the 
Tatmadaw’s political role as the country “matures in democracy”.70 He has also stated 
the need to bring the military progressively under civilian control in meetings with 
foreign diplomats.71 The president has given a similar message, saying that “we will 
be able to steadily reduce the role of our armed forces as we mature in democracy, 
and make progress in our peace building efforts”.72 The chairman of the election 
commission – formerly a senior military officer – stated that the military was in the 
legislature to facilitate negotiations, “because we don’t want a coup”.73 
With regard to long-term interests, the Tatmadaw has always wanted strategic 
military relations with the West, particularly the U.S., to balance China.74 More con-
cretely, it is keen to have access to the advanced weapons systems and modern training 
that many of its South-East Asian peers have. It understands that this is not possible 
without adapting to a future more democratic context.75 
V. Conclusion 
The Tatmadaw has been the most prominent and powerful institution for much of 
Myanmar’s post-independence history. At the same time, in recent years many in the 
military-political elite have recognised that the Tatmadaw would have to step back 
from holding the reins of power in order to reboot the economy and balance China’s 
dominant influence on the country. This came to be seen as a geostrategic and secu-
rity imperative. 
This is why the Tatmadaw initiated the current transition, and has continued to 
be broadly supportive of it – even when it has reduced its economic privileges and 
political influence. At the same time, the constitution gives the Tatmadaw the power 
to protect its essential interests, through its control of key security ministries, free-
dom from civilian oversight and the legislative influence and veto on constitutional 
change provided by its 25 per cent bloc of seats. 
It has signalled that it does not see these prerogatives as permanent, and that it is 
ready to contemplate them being gradually phased out as the new political system 
stabilises and matures. Yet, the indications are that it will move very cautiously, such 
that the Tatmadaw will have a significant role in the political life of the country for 
some time to come – even if it sees advantages to security sector reform, in terms of 
 
 
69 The need for sustained engagement in order to achieve clear progress in this area was under-
scored in the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, “Conflict, Security and Development”, 
particularly chapter 6. 
70 “Commander-in-chief says armed forces responsible for ‘safeguarding constitution’”, op. cit., 
pp. 1, 3. 
71 Crisis Group interviews, several of these diplomats, Yangon, January-March 2014. 
72 “President marks 3rd anniversary of the government with speech”, op. cit., p. 1. 
73 “Burma Election Commission to ban Suu Kyi’s campaign strategy”, The Irrawaddy, 9 April 2014. 
74 See Section III.A above. 
75 Crisis Group interviews, Myanmar sources close to the military, Yangon, January 2014. 
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reputation and the modernisation that would be facilitated by strategic partnerships 
with Western militaries. 
Domestically, it must end ongoing rights abuses and change the way it interacts 
with civilians, particularly in the ethnic borderlands, in order to restore its damaged 
reputation, and transform itself into a professional institution that is reflective of – 
and serves to defend – Myanmar’s ethnic and religious diversity. 
Yangon/Brussels, 22 April 2014 
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